We consider the following version of the stable matching problem. Suppose that men have preferences for women, women have preferences for dogs, and dogs have preferences for men. The goal is to organize them into family units so that no three of them have incentive to desert their assigned family members to join in a new family. This problem is called circular stable matching, allegedly originated by Knuth. We also investigate a generalized version of this problem, in which every participant has preference among all others. The goal is similarly to partition them into oriented triples so that no three persons have incentive to deviate from the assignment. This problem is motivated by recent innovations in kidney exchange, and we call it the 3-way kidney transplant problem. We report complexity, structural and counting results on these two problems.
Fig
. 1 An illustration of kidney exchange with compatibility as preference have preferences for dogs, dogs have preferences for men, and men have preferences for women. The goal is to organize them into stable family units so that people/dogs have no incentive to desert their assigned family members to join in a new family. This problem can be seen as a natural generalization of the well-known 2-party STA-BLE MARRIAGE problem and have been investigated in [3, 5] .
A generalized version of the CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING problem allows each participant to express preference among all others. The goal is to partition 3n persons into oriented triples so that no three of them have reasons to deviate from the assignment. Again, this problem can be regarded as a generalization of the STABLE ROOMMATES problem [6] . This generalized problem has practical interest in the kidney exchange that has received much attention recently [1, 4, 8, 12, [17] [18] [19] [20] . The "preference" here can be interpreted as degrees of compatibility between recipients and donors. Figure 1 gives a more visual way of seeing the connection between circular matching and kidney exchange. In this paper, we call this problem the 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT problem. For ease of presentation, we will refer to all participants in both problems generically as "players."
The two problems require a proper definition of stability. In the two-party STABLE MARRIAGE and STABLE ROOMMATES, a matching is stable if there is no blocking pair: two persons who strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. Naturally, one would extend blocking pairs into blocking triples to define the stability of matchings. However, a blocking triple here is more tricky. To see why this is so, consider the following.
-In CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING, suppose that we have a matching {(m 1 , w 1 We allow players to express their indifferences in the form of ties in the preference lists. Now we say a blocking triple is of degree i if i players are strictly better off in such a triple than in a given matching, while the remaining 3 − i players are indifferent. Note that the indifference can be either because the involved player is still matched to the same partner (or still having the same successor in the oriented triple), or because the involved player has a partner/successor who is tied with her/his/its current assignment. We define a hierarchy of stabilities (which is similar to the one defined by Irving [11] in the 2-party matching) as follows.
-Super Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 1 or 2 or 3. -Strong Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 2 nor those of degree 3. -Weak Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 3.
Contributions of the Paper
Complexity: We prove the following existence problems are NP-complete: super/strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING; super/strong/weak stable matchings in 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT. Therefore, it is unlikely that we can design efficient algorithms to solve these problems. The complexity of weak stable matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING remains open. However, there is empirical evidence indicating that it probably does not belong to the class of NPcomplete problems. We shall discuss this issue later.
Independently, Biró and McDermid [2] obtained similar NP-completeness results for both of problems studied in this work.
Structural Results: It is well-known that stable matchings in 2-party stable marriage and stable roommates have rich structures and sophisticated algorithms have been designed to exploit them [9, 15] . It turns out that strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING have parallel (but even richer) structures. Briefly, we show that the set of strong stable matchings form a union of distributive lattices.
Counting Results: We prove that counting strong stable matchings in both problems is #P-complete. Moreover, the number of strong and weak stable matchings in both problems can be exponential.
Notation and Paper Roadmap
In the paper, we use M, W, D to denote the collections of men and women and dogs in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING. Whatever the problem instance, we will always assume that they are of the same cardinality. Similarly, K means the set of players in 3-way kidney transplant. P (p) denotes the preference list of player p. The notation indicates the preference order in the list. The braces denote a tie. For example, P (m) = {w 1 , w 2 } w 3 means that man m prefers both w 1 and w 2 to w 3 while he is indifferent between the former two. In general, we use μ to denote a 3-dimensional matching (consisted of triples). We will need to consider the induced two-party matching of μ. For example, we write μ| M,W to denote the induced menwomen matching by dropping all dogs from the triples of μ. Finally, π r (X) denotes an arbitrary permutation of the members in the set X.
Section 2 presents complexity results; Sect. 3 reports structural results of stable matching; Sect. 4 concerns the counting of stable matchings. Finally, Sect. 5 draws conclusions.
NP-completeness of Strong Stable Matchings
The reductions we will present share similar ideas to those used in [10] . The main difference lies in the design of "guard players" (to be explained below).
Existence Problem of Super Stable Matchings is NP-complete
To prove that the existence of super stable matchings is NP-complete in circular stable matching, we present a reduction from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING, one of Karp's 21 NP-complete problems [14] . The problem instance is given in the form
The goal is to decide whether a perfect matching μ ⊆ T exists. This problem remains NP-complete even if every player in M ∪ W ∪ D appears exactly 2 or 3 times in the triples of T [7] .
We first explain the intuition behind our reduction. . The aim of our design is that in the derived instance ϒ , in a super stable matching, exactly one doppleganger will be matched to a woman-dog pair with whom m i shares a triple in T , while the other two dopplegangers will be paired off with garbage collectors. In the case that there are only two triples in T containing man m j , we create only Table 1 The preference lists of all players in the derived instance ϒ . Recall that { } denotes a tie in the preferences. Note also that real women W and real dogs D only list real dogs and dopplegangers, respectively, with whom they share triples in T , at the top of their lists
Major players
Preference lists Similarly, the intent is to make sure that in a super stable matching, exactly one doppleganger will be matched to a woman-dog pair with whom m j shares a triple in T while the other is matched to the garbage collectors. Now, we will refer to the set of dopplegangers as
2 and the original set of real women and real dogs as W, D. Collectively, we refer to them as major players
and their preferences are summarized in the left column of Table 1 .
To restrict the possible partners of major players in , we introduce a set of gadgets called guard players. They are denoted as m (p), w (p), d (p), for p ∈ and their preferences are shown in the right column of Table 1 . Their purpose is to ensure that player p, say p = m i1 , will never get a partner ranking lower than his associated guard player w (m i1 ) in a super stable matching. How guard players and major players interact is captured by the following lemma. For the second part, by the above discussion, we know that all major players must be matched to one another.
Lemma 1 In the derived instance
is not part of a super stable matching, they form a blocking triple of degree at least 1.
The third part follows straightforwardly from the previous two.
Lemma 2 The given instance ϒ = (M, W, D, T ) contains a perfect matching if and only if the derived instance ϒ allows a super stable matching.
Proof (Sufficiency) If the derived instance ϒ allows a super stable matching, then by the third part of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that ϒ contains a perfect matching. .) Finally, let the three guard players created for a particular major player be matched to one another. By this construction, it can be verified that we only allow blocking triples of degree 0, which are permissible for a super stable matching.
Theorem 1 Deciding whether a super stable matching exists in a circular stable matching problem with ties in the preferences is NP-complete. This is true even if all ties are of size at most 3 and they are at the front of the preference lists.
To prove the existence of strong stable matching is NP-complete, we can use the same reduction as above with just one alteration: we need a different set of guard players for each major player. Note that in the proof of Lemma 1, we rely on blocking triples of degree 1; those are not counted as blocking triples based on the definition of strong stable matching.
The design of guard players for the reduction of strong stable matching is similar to those used in a reduction in Sect. 2.3, so we omit the details here. 1 
Strong/Super Stability in 3-way Kidney Transplant
We now present a reduction from a circular stable matching instance ϒ = (M, W, D, L) (with or without ties in the preferences) to a 3-way kidney transplant instance ϒ . Suppose that m ∈ M, w ∈ W, d ∈ D have preferences P (m), P (w), P (d), respectively. In ϒ , their preferences are transformed into
To prove this is a valid reduction, we have to argue that strong/super stable matchings exist in ϒ if and only if they exist in ϒ . It is straightforward to show one direction (from ϒ to ϒ ), but the other direction takes some argument.
Lemma 3 If a strong/super stable matching μ exists in ϒ , the following holds
-Every oriented triple contains exactly one man, one woman, and one dog.
-Given a triple t ∈ μ , t's orientation must be t = (m, w, d).
Proof For the first part, without loss of generality, assume that a triple t ∈ μ contains at least two men. There are three possible cases and all lead to contradiction.
Suppose that t = (m, m , m ).
Then there exist two triples t and t , which contain two women and two dogs, respectively. As a result, a woman w ∈ t and a dog d ∈ t have as successors a woman, and a dog, respectively. Similarly, there is a man m ∈ t whose successor is another man. Then By Lemma 3, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 2
It is NP-complete to decide whether a strong/super stable matching exists in the 3-way kidney transplant problem.
Weak Stability in 3-way Kidney Transplant
The reduction we are presenting in this section shares similar basic ideas to those we used in Sect. 2.1: reduction from a 3-dimensional matching problem instance
, and using sets of guard players to restrict the potential partners (successors in triples) of the major players. The key difference is the design of the guard players' preferences.
We introduce the following gadget for each major player
(Note that real women W and real dogs D do not need them.) Let ϒ k be a 3-way kidney transplant instance that has the following three properties: (1) It contains 7 players, k # i , 1 ≤ i ≤ 7, (2) it does not allow any weak stable matching, and (3) if one player, k # 1 , is removed from ϒ k , then the remaining 6 players' preferences allow at least one weak stable matching. Such an instance ϒ k can be found in Appendix A. Our plan is to "embed" instances ϒ k into the intended 3-way kidney transplant instance ϒ .
We now explain in more detail what we mean by embedding of ϒ k into ϒ . For illustration, we first show the preferences of m i1 and his six associated guard players in ϒ . Proof If m i1 is matched to someone ranking lower than w ia , then whatever the oriented triples of μ involving the six guard partners of m i1 and m i1 himself, the situation is identical to one where we have a matching μ φ for the problem instance ϒ m i1 , which by design, involves at least one blocking triple of degree 3 to block μ φ , and also μ . The second part of the lemma follows from the first part and the way we chose the gadget ϒ k (= ϒ m i1 ).
The detailed preferences of major players can be found in Table 2 . Note that Lemma 4 also applies to other major players who have associated guard players. Thus, in a weak stable matching, they will get a successor ranking strictly higher than their guard players.
Theorem 3 Deciding whether a weak stable matching exists in a 3-way kidney transplant problem is NP-complete.
Proof By Lemma 4, if μ is a weak stable matching in ϒ , we can throw away triples involving guard players of ϒ , along with the garbage collectors (and the dopplegangers matched to them). Replace the doppleganger m ij with the real man m i gives the desired perfect matching μ in ϒ . 
For the other direction, we will construct a weak stable matching μ in ϒ based on a perfect matching μ in (Or we only add the first two triples, provided that m i only appears twice in the triples of T .) It can be observed that μ involves only blocking triples of degree at most 2, which are allowed because of the definition of weak stable matchings.
Structures of Strong Stable Matchings
We first review the definition of distributive lattices. 
Note that in this section, we assume that all preference lists are strictly ordered. Our major finding regarding the structure of strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING is that they are a collection of distributive lattices. In particular, consider the subset of strong stable matchings in which all players in one group (men, women, or dogs) have the same partners. Such a subset is a distributive lattice. The following theorem gives a more precise statement. q i1 ), (p i2 , q i2 ) , . . . , (p in , q in )} where p ij = p ij , q ij = q ij , p ij ∈ P, q ij ∈ Q, P, Q ∈ {M, W, D}, P = Q, the subset of strong stable matchings N P,Q = {μ|μ ∈ , μ| P,Q = N P,Q } is a distributive lattice.
Theorem 4 Let ϒ = (M, W, D, P) be a circular stable matching instance and let the set of strong stable matchings in ϒ be denoted as . Given a two-party matching
We make two remarks here. First, when we consider a non-empty subset N P,Q = N M,W of strong stable matchings, we impose a partial order on the elements based on the welfare of one particular group, which, in this case, is W. (Note that all men M are doing the same in all strong stable matchings in N M,W .) Thus, if μ, μ ∈ N M,W , then μ μ if and only if all women in W are getting dogs in μ ranking at least as high as those they get in μ . Second, if N P,Q = ∅, we are assuming that it is (vacuously) a distributive lattice. Proof Let X , Y be the sets of men and women preferring μ respectively; analogously, let X , Y be the set of men and women preferring μ respectively.
We claim that if m ∈ X , then his partner w in μ must be a member of Y . If this is not so, then Now, armed with Lemmas 6 and 7, we can introduce the lemma that establishes the distributive law of the lattice.
Lemma 8 Let μ, μ and μ be three strong stable matchings in
Proof Lemmas 6 and 7 establish that meet and join operations result in a strong stable matching in N D,M . The distributive law can be easily verified.
The correctness of Theorem 4 follows from Lemmas 6, 7 and 8.
#P-completeness of Strong Stable Matchings
In this section, we present a reduction from the 2-party STABLE MARRIAGE problem to the 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT problem. Counting the number of stable matchings in a stable marriage instance is #P-complete, a fact established by Irving and Leather [13] .
To build up some intuition, we first show how to "embed" a STABLE MAR- 1 , w j 1 , d j 1 ), (m j 2 , w j 2 , d j 2 ) Unfortunately, the above construction of ϒ is not a reduction, instead, it is merely an embedding. There is no guarantee that some other strong stable matching (in which dogs are not always matched to their top-ranked men) will not arise in ϒ . To prove the #P-completeness, we need one more twist.
We transform ϒ into a 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT INSTANCE ϒ = (K , L ) as follows. We first make a copy of every player in M ∪ W ∪ D and add it into K . For each dog d i ∈ K , we create a set of guard players to restrict its possible successors in a strong stable matching. The idea here is similar to the one we used in the reduction of Sect. 2.3. We need an instance
which has the properties: (1) it has four players, k #
, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4, and (2) it does not allow strong stable matching itself (see Appendix A for such an instance).
We embed ϒ d i into ϒ by altering the preferences of d i and its associated three guard players as follows.
) is the preference list of , w j 2 , d j 2 ) , . . . , (m jn , w jn , d jn )} is strongly stable in ϒ . Therefore, the reduction from ϒ to ϒ is correct. Using a similar and slightly more complicated gadget (of guard players), it is also possible to have a reduction from ϒ to an instance of CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING. We omit it here.
We conclude this section with the following theorem.
Theorem 6
It is #P-complete to count the number of strong stable matchings in both circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant problems.
Conclusion
We have left a complexity issue unanswered: existence of a weak stable circular matching. We were unable to come up with a NP-complete reduction, for there is no similar gadget (a small instance allowing no weak stable matchings) to the one we used in Sect. 2.3. Indeed, the reason may go deeper. Empirical evidence indicates that the number of weak stable circular matchings grows extraordinarily fast with the problem size. Eriksson, Sjöstrand and Strimling [5] conjectured that weak stable matchings always exist. This is why we remarked previously that finding one is probably not NP-complete. Interestingly, Biró and McDermid [2] designed a small instance without weak stable matchings-under the assumption that players can truncate their preference lists. They were thus able to prove that the existence of weak stable matchings is also NP-complete in this context.
The obvious open questions are: when preferences are required to be complete, is there an instance in which no weak stable matchings exist? And if there is no such instance, is there a technique to prove their perennial existence.
